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1 
JUSTICE DISEASED IS JUSTICE DENIED: 






On December 31, 2019, health authorities in Wuhan, China, confirmed 
that an unidentified pathogen was the likely cause of twenty-seven recent 
cases of pneumonia identified across the region.1 Just a week later, internal 
and external pressures forced Chinese authorities to announce the 
discovery of a novel coronavirus in Wuhan.2 Despite efforts at 
containment, the virus jumped from Wuhan to countries across the globe 
in the following months.3 By January 21, 2020, the United States had 
confirmed its first case of the novel coronavirus in Washington state.4 The 
virus spread rapidly across the continent, resulting in thousands of 
infections and hundreds of fatalities before the end of March.5 Federal, 
state, and local governments responded with varying degrees of efficiency 
and efficacy, generally stressing the value of “social distancing” in 
slowing the spread of the disease to afford hospitals precious time to 
respond to new cases.6 Private and public institutions largely shuttered, 
 
* Judicial Clerk to the Hon. Robert C. Chambers, United States District Court for the 
Southern District of West Virginia. A.B. Georgetown University (2016); J.D. 
Georgetown University Law Center (2019). Many thanks to the editors of the West 
Virginia Law Review who have worked so diligently to prepare this Article for 
publication. The coronavirus pandemic is constantly evolving, and any information 
contained here is likely to be outdated the moment that this Article is published. For up-
to-date information on the outbreak, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
(“CDC”) maintains an active record of information related to the novel coronavirus on 
its website: https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/index.html. As is likely self-
evident, all opinions contained in this Article are mine alone. 
1 Chinese Officials Investigate Cause of Pneumonia Outbreak in Wuhan, REUTERS (Dec. 
31, 2019, 2:55 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-health-
pneumonia/chinese-officials-investigate-cause-of-pneumonia-outbreak-in-wuhan-
idUSKBN1YZ0GP. 
2 Sui-Lee Wee & Donald G. McNeil Jr., China Identifies New Virus Causing 
Pneumonialike Illness, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 8, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/08/health/china-pneumonia-outbreak-virus.html. 
3 China Coronavirus Spread is Accelerating, Xi Jinping Warns, BBC (Jan. 26, 2020), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-51249208. 
4 Lena H. Sun & Larry Bergstein, First U.S. Case of Potentially Deadly Chinese 
Coronavirus Confirmed in Washington State, WASH. POST (Jan. 21, 2020), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/health/2020/01/21/coronavirus-us-case/. 
5 Cases of Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) in the U.S., CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL 
& PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/cases-updates/cases-in-
us.html (last visited Mar. 20, 2020). 
6 Julia Belluz, What Happens Next in the Coronavirus Outbreak? We Mapped 8 
Scenarios., VOX (Feb. 6, 2020, 6:17 AM), 
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with universities sending students home to their parents and restaurants 
switching to takeout-only models.7 Medium-to-large gatherings of any 
sort were discouraged or banned,8 and some grocery store shelves were 
left empty.9  
The federal courts were not immune to these institutional pressures; 
indeed, their internal composition of judges, clerks, deputies, and other 
courthouse personnel largely resembles that of other large public 
institutions. Yet the judiciary, by its very nature, is not a normal public 
institution. Unlike the average administrative agency or cabinet 
department, the federal courts exist to guarantee the statutory and 
constitutional rights that form the bedrock of the American system of 
government. And while the disruption of any public agency’s operations 
in light of a pandemic will likely inconvenience or harm some subset of 
the population, few disruptions are as significant as restricting access to 
the judicial system. This is acutely true in the case of criminal defendants, 
as delays in proceedings will seriously impact their right to a speedy trial.10 
And although all criminal defendants are vulnerable to a suspension of 
various key constitutional rights, pretrial detainees in particular may 
wallow in prison for indeterminate periods of time pending trials that may 
never arrive. Writing from a Birmingham Jail and speaking to different 
facts, Martin Luther King, Jr., captured the essence of the dilemma well: 




7 Nick Anderson & Susan Svluga, Georgetown and U-Va. Join Cascade of Schools That 
Will Halt In-person Teaching Because of Coronavirus, WASH. POST (Mar. 11, 2020), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/education/2020/03/11/georgetown-u-suspends-in-
person-teaching-until-further-notice-because-coronavirus/; Rich Van Wyk, With Dining 
In Now Out, Restaurants Turn to Grab and Go, WTHR (Mar. 16, 2020, 10:36 PM), 
https://www.wthr.com/article/dining-now-out-restaurants-turn-grab-and-go. 
8 Knvul Sheikh, No More Than 10 People in One Place, Trump Said. But Why?, N.Y. 
TIMES (Mar. 16, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/16/health/coronavirus-social-
distancing-crowd-size.html. 
9 Luke Winkie, A Grocery Store Clerk Explains What It’s Like on the Front Lines of 
Coronavirus Panic, VOX (Mar. 17, 2020, 7:00 AM), https://www.vox.com/the-
goods/2020/3/17/21182155/grocery-store-coronavirus-clerk-q-a-immunocompromise. 
10 As in any article addressing the right to trial by jury, it is worth noting that criminal 
jury trials are an increasingly endangered species across the federal court system. See 
John Gramlich, Only 2% of Federal Criminal Defendants Go to Trial, and Most Who Do 
Are Found Guilty, PEW RESEARCH CENTER: FACTTANK (June 11, 2019), 
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/06/11/only-2-of-federal-criminal-
defendants-go-to-trial-and-most-who-do-are-found-guilty/. Given the prominent role of 
the jury trial right in our constitutional system, outsized academic focus on the question 
is to be expected. Yet scholars and practitioners should always acknowledge that, for the 
majority of federal defendants, abstract discussions of jury trials are somewhat trivial. 
11 See Martin Luther King, Jr., “Letter from a Birmingham Jail [King, Jr.]” (Apr. 16, 
1963), https://www.africa.upenn.edu/Articles_Gen/Letter_Birmingham.html. 
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This Article aims to consider the immediate impacts of the novel 
coronavirus on criminal defendants’ access to speedy trials by jury.12 In 
particular, it aims to examine whether court closures and delays could 
affect the substantive rights of criminal defendants—and particularly 
pretrial detainees—to a speedy and public trial by jury. To date, very little 
scholarship has considered this question.13 Yet the ideal of a speedy trial 
by jury is deeply embedded in our Constitution and our judicial system, 
and the potential for a pandemic to limit or negate that right should ring 
scholastic and judicial alarm bells.  
This analysis proceeds in three parts. Part I surveys the rapidly 
changing responses by a sample of federal district courts across the 
country to the coronavirus outbreak.14 Part II examines the constitutional 
and statutory authority that may conflict with the judiciary’s attempt to 
avoid exposure to the virus altogether. Finally, Part III concludes by 
suggesting that courts ought to maintain the right to delay proceedings and 
manage their dockets in confronting the imminent threat of the novel 
coronavirus, but that this control is subject to an upper (and fact-specific) 
constitutional bound beyond which courts cannot delay criminal jury 
trials. 
 
I. CORONAVIRUS AND THE COURTS 
 
 The response to the coronavirus pandemic throughout the federal 
judiciary has been as swift as it has been broad. Much like other public 
institutions and private workplaces, courts have quickly adopted new 
policies to slow the spread of disease and protect judicial and 
administrative employees. Given the decentralized nature of federal 
 
12 While this article focuses on the federal court system, state courts have adopted 
stringent restrictions in response to the coronavirus pandemic that mirror their federal 
counterparts. See, e.g., Courtney Hessler, High Court Declares Judicial Emergency, 




13 There is limited scholarship that has considered the right to a speedy trial in the context 
of natural disasters. See, e.g., Patrick Ellard, Learning from Katrina: Emphasizing the 
Right to a Speedy Trial to Protect Constitutional Guarantees in Disasters, 44 AM. CRIM. 
L. REV. 1207 (2007). Yet while natural disasters and pandemics may share the ability to 
fundamentally disrupt the functioning of a region’s economy and governmental 
institutions, even severe natural disasters are not as wide-reaching or open-ended as the 
current coronavirus outbreak. 
14 See Robert Loeb et al., The Federal Courts Begin to Adapt to COVID-19, LAWFARE 
(Mar. 18, 2020, 1:29 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/federal-courts-begin-adapt-
covid-19. Although both federal district and appellate courts have reacted to the 
coronavirus pandemic, district courts directly implicate defendants’ access to a speedy 
and public jury trial. As such, this article is focused primarily on district courts rather 
than their appellate counterparts. 
3
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4 
district courts, and the circuit courts of appeal that are situated above them, 
responses to the outbreak have understandably differed somewhat across 
all ninety-four federal judicial districts.15 Nevertheless, a review of various 
courts’ preventative measures still reveal a great deal of underlying 
similarity. Relevant to this article—and as is explained in detail below—
many federal district courts have already determined that a continuance in 
all jury trials is warranted. 
There are good reasons to support this decision, particularly in the 
short run. First, jury trials—by definition—involve calling together 
dozens of randomly-selected individuals who would otherwise have no 
reason to come in contact with each other.16 At the very least, each of these 
individuals will spend time in close contact during a voir dire process of 
indeterminate length.17 Assuming an individual is seated as a juror, she 
will spend hours sitting in a tightly-packed jury box or a small deliberation 
room with her fellow jurors. She will leave the courthouse only to 
purchase lunch at a grab-and-go business,18 and then likely return to the 
courthouse to eat. In this environment, the health of each juror and every 
other occupant of the courtroom in which they are seated weighs heavily 
against conducting criminal jury trials.  
Of course, there is also the health of the defendant to consider, who—
if detained—will likely be more vulnerable to infection in prison.19 
 
15 Yet even beyond the structure of the federal judiciary, much of this is the result of the 
uneven impact of coronavirus across the country; on March 17, 2020, for example, 
Washington had already reported 1,012 confirmed cases of the virus before West Virginia 
had reported its first. See Coronavirus Daily News Updates, March 17: What to Know 
Today About COVID-19 in the Seattle Area, Washington State, and the Nation, SEATTLE 
TIMES (Mar. 18, 2020, 7:12 AM), https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-
news/health/coronavirus-daily-news-updates-march-17-what-to-know-today-about-
covid-19-in-the-seattle-area-washington-state-and-the-nation/; Phil Kabler, Justice 
Confirms WV’s First Case of Coronavirus, HERALD-DISPATCH (Mar. 17, 2020), 
https://www.herald-dispatch.com/coronavirus/justice-confirms-wv-s-first-case-of-
coronavirus/article_7e034a25-949e-5085-8494-87ae9b570016.html. 
16 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 23(b)(1) (“A jury consists of 12 persons unless this rule provides 
otherwise.”); see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(b). Indeed, many courts that have cancelled or 
postponed criminal jury trials have explicitly noted concerns about juror health in 
reaching their conclusion. See, e.g., General Order 02-20, at 2, In re Court Operations 
Under the Exigent Circumstances Created by COVID-19 and Related Coronavirus (W.D. 
Wash. Mar. 17, 2020), https://www.wawd.uscourts.gov/sites/wawd/files/03-17-
20GeneralOrder02-20.pdf [hereinafter W.D. Wash. General Order]. 
17 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(b). If this risk were not evident enough as a hypothetical, 
Ohio’s first post-coronavirus jury trial was continued after the defendant experienced 
shortness of breath and nearly fainted. Max Mitchell, Ohio’s First Post-COVID Jury 
Trial Was Set to Begin. Then the Defendant Nearly Collapsed, LAW.COM (Apr. 29, 2020, 
6:48 PM), https://www.law.com/2020/04/29/ohios-first-post-covid-jury-trial-was-set-to-
begin-then-the-defendant-nearly-collapsed/.  
18 See Van Wyk, supra note 7. 
19 See Salvador Hernandez, The Coronavirus Is Hitting US Prisons, and Advocates Fear 
Sick Inmates Will Be Afraid To Get Treatment, BUZZFEED NEWS (Mar. 23, 2020, 8:33 
4
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Whether one’s primary concern is a defendant infecting courtroom 
participants or courtroom participants infecting a defendant, both 
outcomes are possible and avoidable. Finally, practical considerations of 
life during a pandemic will likely complicate the task of calling witnesses 
(who may have difficulty traveling),20 presenting evidence (which may 
rely on laboratory reports that will be delayed),21 and even finishing a trial 
(in the case that several jurors become sick).22 Put simply: courts acting to 
delay jury trials are not doing so out of any irrational or intentional desire 
to avoid adjudicating cases but rather to avoid unnecessary transmission 
of a virus that has already proven lethal to thousands. 
Regardless of the motivations behind these delays, they are occurring 
across the federal court system. The standing orders issued to carry them 
into effect are broadly similar and typically determine that any delay is 
time excludable under the Speedy Trial Act.23 In particular, courts have 
tended to find that “the ends of justice served by” a continuance “outweigh 
the interests of the parties and the public in a speedy trial.”24 Beyond these 
broad similarities, however, the precise provisions of each order 
continuing trials has varied from federal judicial district to federal judicial 
district. In the District of the District of Columbia, for example, Chief 
Judge Beryl A. Howell ordered that all jury trials scheduled to begin 




20 See Coronavirus and Travel in the United States, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & 
PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/travelers/travel-in-the-
us.html (last visited Mar. 23, 2020). 
21 See Megan Crepeau & Jeremy Gorner, State Crime Lab Scales Back Operations Amid 
Coronavirus Spread, Leading to Shelving of Drug Cases, CHI. TRIB. (Mar. 20, 2020, 2:53 
PM), https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/criminal-justice/ct-coronavirus-state-
crime-lab-impact-20200320-pwcpakrajrbujhuzygoy2yy5ki-story.html. 
22 See Ben Feuerherd, Sick Juror Allowed to Deliberate via FaceTime Amid Coronavirus, 
N.Y. POST (Mar. 16, 2020, 2:48 PM), https://nypost.com/2020/03/16/sick-juror-allowed-
to-deliberate-via-facetime-amid-coronavirus/. 
23 See, e.g., Standing Order at 2, In re: Coronavirus/COVID-19 Pandemic, No. M10-468 
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 13, 2020), https://nysd.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/2020-
03/20%20MISC%20154a%20%28002%29%20-%20In%20Re%20Coronavirus-
COVID-19%20Pandemic.pdf [hereinafter S.D.N.Y. Standing Order); Standing Order at 
2, In re: Court Operations in Exigent Circumstances Created by the COVID-19 
Pandemic, No. 20-09 (D.D.C. Mar. 16, 2020), 
https://www.dcd.uscourts.gov/sites/dcd/files/Court%20Operations%20Standing%20Or
der%2020-9.pdf [hereinafter D.D.C. Standing Order]; W.D. Wash. General Order, supra 
note 16, at 2; General Order at 2, In re: Court Operations under the Exigent 
Circumstances created by COVID-19 and Related Coronavirus Health Conditions, No. 
86 (D. Vt. Mar. 23, 2020), 
https://www.vtd.uscourts.gov/sites/vtd/files/General%20Order%2386.FINAL_.pdf 
[hereinafter D. Vt. General Order]. The Speedy Trial Act is discussed in more detail infra. 
24 Id. 
5
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order of the court.25 The same order postponed all civil, criminal, and 
bankruptcy proceedings through April 17, 2020.26 In the Southern District 
of New York, Chief Judge Colleen McMahon entered a similar—though 
more temporally-limited—order continuing jury trials scheduled to begin 
before April 27, 2020.27 Ongoing trials, as well as grand jury proceedings, 
were unaffected by the order.28 In the Western District of Washington, 
Chief Judge Ricardo Martinez entered a standing order closing the Seattle 
and Tacoma courthouses and staying all criminal and civil proceedings 
until June 1, 2020.29 And while all three of these examples represent 
particular coronavirus “hotspots,”30 federal courts across the country have 
limited operations. In the District of Vermont, for example, Chief Judge 
Geoffrey Crawford entered an order staying all criminal and civil 
proceedings to some date in the future.31 In the Southern District of West 
Virginia, Chief Judge Thomas E. Johnston entered a similar order 
continuing “all civil and criminal petit jury selections and trials scheduled 
to commence [from March 23, 2020] through April 24, 2020.”32 These 
delays are not insubstantial, particularly given the number of pretrial 
detainees in the federal system33 and the potential for continued social 
distancing mandates.34 It is with this background in mind that an 
examination of relevant constitutional and statutory law is warranted. 
 
II. CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY CONSIDERATIONS 
 
 At the highest level of generality, the coronavirus pandemic and 
accompanying courtroom delays implicate two areas of law: the Sixth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution and the Speedy Trial Act 
that seeks to carry its guarantees into effect. While both are relevant in a 
discussion of jury trial delays, the Speedy Trial Act’s broad exemptions 
 
25 D.D.C. Standing Order, supra note 23.  
26 Id. at 3. 
27 S.D.N.Y. Standing Order, supra note 23, at 1. 
28 Id. at 2. 
29 W.D. Wash. General Order, supra note 16, at 2. 
30 See Cases in U.S., CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, 
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/cases-updates/cases-in-us.html (last visited 
Mar. 20, 2020). 
31 D. Vt. General Order, supra note 23, at 1.  
32 General Order #3, In re: Court Operations in Light of the Exigent Circumstances 
Presented by the COVID-19 Pandemic, No. 2:20-mc-00052 (S.D.W.V. Mar. 23, 2020), 
https://www.wvsd.uscourts.gov/pdfs/generalorders/covid19/Gen%20Order%203%20wi
th%20header.pdf. 
33 See Matthew G. Rowland, The Rising Federal Pretrial Detention Rate, in Context, 82 
FED. PROB. 2 (Sept. 2018), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/fedprobation-
sept2018_0.pdf. 
34 See W.D. Wash. General Order, supra note 16, at 4 (noting that the “Court will vacate 
or amend this General Order no later than April 15, 2020”).  
6
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render it somewhat of a dead letter in the context of the coronavirus 
pandemic. Instead, the somewhat “slippery” provisions of the Sixth 
Amendment’s Speedy Trial Clause are the likeliest source of relief for 
criminal defendants awaiting trial. 
 
A. Sixth Amendment 
 
The Framers were no strangers to pandemic disease. Devastating 
outbreaks of smallpox had swept across the continent in the decades before 
the Founding,35 and George Washington himself nearly died after 
contracting the disease during a trip to Barbados in 1751.36 Yet in a world 
where widespread illness was a norm and viral infection was often a death 
sentence, the role of infection played no discernable role in the actual 
drafting of the Constitution.37 The opposite is true of the notion of trial by 
jury, which was afforded outsized importance in the drafting of the 
Constitution and of the Bill of Rights.38 Largely viewed as a bulwark 
against abusive government,39 juries were enshrined in Article III’s 
guarantee that the “Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, 
shall be by Jury.”40 The Sixth Amendment added more substance to the 
jury trial guarantee, providing in part that in “all criminal prosecutions, the 
 
35 Elise A. Mitchell, The Shortages May Be Worse Than the Disease, ATLANTIC (Mar. 
11, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/03/humanitys-long-history-
of-making-epidemics-worse/607780/. 
36 Fred Barbash, Here’s to George Washington, Afflicted With So Many Killer Diseases 
It’s Miraculous He Survived to Become Father of Our Nation, WASH. POST (Feb. 22, 
2017, 9:16 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-
mix/wp/2017/02/22/heres-to-george-washington-afflicted-with-so-many-killer-
diseases-its-miraculous-he-became-father-of-our-nation/. Washington’s relationship 
with smallpox continued through the American Revolution, when he became one of the 
first military commanders in history to order the mass inoculation of his troops against 
the disease; Amy Lynn Filsinger & Raymond Dwek, George Washington and the First 
Mass Military Inoculation, LIBR. CONGRESS SCI. REFERENCE SERVICES, 
https://www.loc.gov/rr/scitech/GW&smallpoxinoculation.html. Writing to Dr. William 
Shippen, Jr. in 1777, Washington explained that “Necessity not only authorizes but seems 
to require the measure, for should the disorder infect the Army . . . we should have more 
to dread from it, than from the Sword of the Enemy.” Id. 
37 See generally DAVID O. STEWART, THE SUMMER OF 1787 (2007). In fact, perhaps the 
only part played by disease at the Convention was as an excuse to avoid attending in the 
first place. See id. at 41 (noting that two particularly hypochondriacal delegates—“one 
from Connecticut and one from Maryland”—chose not to attend the convention because 
of Philadelphia’s “lurid reputation for disease”). 
38 See Albert W. Alschuler & Andrew G. Deiss, A Brief History of Criminal Jury in the 
United States, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 867, 871 (1994) (characterizing the importance of juries 
as “the most consistent point of agreement between the Federalists and Anti-Federalists” 
during debates over ratification).  
39 Id. (noting that the “framers’ enthusiastic support for the jury stemmed in large measure 
form the role that juries had played in resisting English authority before the revolution”). 
40 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3. 
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accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial 
jury.”41  
Much academic ink has been spilled on both constitutional provisions, 
and it would be inadvisable and impossible to reproduce that work here.42 
In any case, it is only the narrow guarantee of a “speedy” trial that is 
directly relevant to the current pandemic and its attendant effects on the 
federal court system. Concerns over judicial efficiency in administering 
trials have deep roots in the common law; indeed, the first hint of a 
guarantee to a “speedy” trial can be traced back as far as 1166 C.E. and 
King Henry II’s promulgation of rules for civil and criminal procedure in 
the Assize of Clarendon.43 Despite this extensive background, the United 
States Supreme Court has devoted relatively little attention to the speedy 
trial guarantee throughout most of its history. The Court did not examine 
the right at all until 190544 and did not deem it fundamental until 1967.45  
A watershed arrived in 1972 with Barker v. Wingo,46 which laid out a 
four-part test that continues to govern courts’ consideration of speedy trial 
claims.47 Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Powell characterized the 
right to a speedy trial as “amorphous” and “slippery.”48 In view of these 
interpretive challenges, the Court adopted a balancing test to address 
speedy trial claims on “an ad hoc basis.”49 The Court identified four 
factors in determining whether a defendant’s right to a speedy trial has 
been violated: “length of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant’s 
assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant.”50 Applying this 
reasoning to the case before the Court, Justice Powell reasoned that “the 
length of delay between arrest and trial—well over five years” did not 
warrant dismissal of the indictment against the petitioner.51 Nevertheless, 
the Court considered the case “to be close” and based its conclusion 
 
41 U.S. CONST. amend. VI (emphasis added). 
42 See generally Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 38; Jack Pope, The Jury, 39 TEX. L. REV. 
426 (1961). 
43 Greg Ostfeld, Speedy Justice and Timeless Delays: The Validity of Open-Ended “Ends-
of-Justice” Continuances Under the Speedy Trial Act, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1037, 1057 
n.79 (1997). Inter alia, the rules provided that “when a robber or murderer or thief or the 
receivers of them be arrested,” a nearby judicial officer should be contacted to provide 
swift justice to the accused. ASSIZE OF CLARENDON, 1166 ¶ 6, 
https://avalon.law.yale.edu/medieval/assizecl.asp. 
44 See Beavers v. Haubert, 198 U.S. 77, 87 (1905) (essentially creating a fact-specific 
inquiry into speedy trial violations). 
45 See Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 223 (1967) (deeming the right to a speedy 
trial “fundamental”). 
46 407 U.S. 514 (1972). 
47 Id. at 530. 
48 Id. at 522. 
49 Id. at 530. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. at 534–36. 
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primarily on the fact that the petitioner “did not want a speedy trial.”52 The 
Court also noted that a defendant’s pretrial detention could weigh in favor 
of dismissing an indictment, writing that “the disadvantages for the 
accused who cannot obtain his relief” from jail are even more serious than 
those released on bond.53  
The Barker test remains the touchstone for courts’ analyses of speedy 
trial claims.54 And while it is impossible to fix any precise point after 
which a defendant’s right to a speedy trial has been violated, the essential 
point remains: there is an upper bound to the delays trial courts may 
impose on criminal defendants.55  
 
B. Speedy Trial Act 
 
The Barker test’s looseness prompted relatively swift action from 
Congress, which passed the Speedy Trial Act56 just two years after Barker 
was announced. At its core, the Speedy Trial Act establishes several key 
deadlines throughout the course of a federal criminal prosecution. An 
information or indictment must be filed within 30 days of one’s arrest or 
service of summons,57 and a trial must begin within 70 days of the date 
that an information or indictment is filed.58 Absent any exception, 
dismissal of an indictment is warranted where the Act’s time limits are 
violated.59 
Broad and stringent though the these provisions may appear, nine 
exclusions serve to give courts a degree of discretion over the actual trial 
date of a given defendant.60 Eight of these exclusions are relatively 
narrow, applying—inter alia—where resolution of pretrial motions 
 
52 Id. at 534. 
53 Id. at 532. 
54 See, e.g., Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 651 (1992) (applying Barker to an 
“extraordinary 8 ½ year lag between [Defendant’s] indictment and arrest” and concluding 
dismissal of indictment was warranted). Just last year, a Washington appellate court held 
that a thirty-eight year delay between the first and second time a defendant was charged 
for the same crime violated the Constitution’s speedy trial guarantee. See State v. Ross, 
441 P.3d 1254, 1269 (Wash. Ct. App. 2019). Quoting Barker, the court noted that “[a] 
defendant has no duty to bring himself to trial” and that the delay in the petitioner’s trial 
was “unprecedented in speedy trial cases.” Id. at 941–43.  
55 See Barker, 407 U.S. at 532 (reasoning that preventing “oppressive pretrial 
incarceration” is a key interest protected by the speedy trial guarantee). 
56 Pub. L. No. 93-619, 88 Stat. 2076 (1975), codified at 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 3161–74 (West 
2020). 
57 18 U.S.C.A § 3161(b). 
58 Id. § 3161(c)(1).  
59 Id. § 3162(a)(1). Dismissal may be with or without prejudice, depending on “the 
seriousness of the offense; the facts and circumstances of the case which led to the 
dismissal; and the impact of a reprosecution on the administration of this chapter and on 
the administration of justice.” Id.  
60 Id. § 3161(h).  
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requires extra time61 or where interlocutory appeals are pending.62 The 
ninth exception is far broader and allows courts to exclude time “on the 
basis of [a judge’s] findings that the ends of justice served by taking such 
action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a 
speedy trial.”63 This latter provision has served as the basis for 
continuances during the coronavirus pandemic and has tended to negate 
any benefit of efficiency criminal defendants would otherwise receive 
from the Speedy Trial Act.64 Limits on such “ends-of-justice” 
continuances vary from circuit to circuit,65 but courts have approved of 
delays lasting as long as 425 days.66 
 
III. CORONAVIRUS AND THE CONSTITUTION 
 
 Despite the lack of public discussion surrounding the issue, courts 
were not blind to the potential tension between delay and the rights of 
criminal defendants before continuing upcoming trials. The Southern 
District of New York noted as much in its standing order, confirming that 
it was “cognizant of the right of criminal defendants to a speedy and public 
trial under the Sixth Amendment, and the particular application of that 
right in cases involving defendants who are detained pending trial.”67 Yet, 
merely nodding at the problem does not obviate it, and courts are obligated 
to take stock of the constitutional implications of delays stemming from 
the coronavirus pandemic. 
 This is particularly true with respect to pretrial detainees and, 
specifically, with reference to the Constitution’s Speedy Trial Clause. 
Indeed, the Speedy Trial Act offers little to actually analyze in the context 
of the coronavirus pandemic. The ends-of-justice exclusion is broad, and 
so long as a court explains the reasons behind a continuance on the record, 
then it is well within its rights to count any delay as time excludable from 
the typical seventy-day trial clock.68 A much closer question stems from 
the Speedy Trial Clause itself, however. Indeed, a review of the Barker 
balancing factors suggests that dismissal may well be warranted in certain 
cases as this pandemic progresses. 
 
61 Id. § 3161(h)(1)(F). 
62 Id. § 3161(h)(1)(E). 
63 Id. § 3161(h)(7)(A). 
64 See supra note 23. 
65 See Ostfeld, supra note 43, at 1042–52. 
66 United States v. Lattany, 982 F.2d 866, 868 (3d Cir. 1992). 
67 S.D.N.Y. Standing Order, supra note 23, at 2. The Court went on to note that “[a]ny 
motion by a criminal defendant seeking an exception to this order in order to exercise 
that right [to a speedy jury trial] should be directed to the District Judge assigned to the 
matter in the first instance.” Id. 
68 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3161(h)(8) (West 2020). 
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 First, the unprecedented nature of the coronavirus outbreak suggests 
that the length of any delay facing defendants could be quite substantial. 
To date, federal courts have addressed the crisis by continuing trials for a 
definite period of weeks or months; the Western District of Washington, 
for example, continued all trials until June 1, 2020,69 while the Southern 
District of New York continued all trials until April 27, 2020.70 While a 
delay until either date is not insubstantial, it seems unlikely that a limited 
delay of a matter of weeks or several months would amount to a 
constitutional violation apart from any other compelling facts.71 Yet some 
models are significantly more pessimistic about the possibility of 
expeditiously ending the coronavirus outbreak, projecting that continued 
social distancing measures may be necessary for another year and a half.72 
As trial dates drag out further into the future, speedy trial claims will only 
gain in merit. This is particularly true for those accused of less serious 
offenses, as “the delay that can be tolerated for an ordinary street crime is 
considerably less than for a serious, complex conspiracy charge.”73 
 As to the second Barker factor—the reason for the delay—criminal 
defendants are not as fortunate. As noted earlier, courts that have delayed 
trials have done so for entirely valid and appropriate reasons and with an 
eye toward advice from medical experts and government officials.74 Yet 
the validity of this reasoning is not open-ended. As social distancing 
measures and pharmaceutical interventions begin to slow the spread of the 
coronavirus, the persuasiveness of courts’ reliance on disease as a 
justification for delay will similarly decline. 
 The third factor—a defendant’s responsibility to assert his right to a 
speedy trial—will obviously vary case by case. A defendant who is 
released on a pretrial bond and who makes no effort to actually pursue a 
 
69 W.D. Wash. General Order, supra note 16. 
70 S.D.N.Y. Standing Order, supra note 23, at 1.  
71 See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 534–36 (1972) (holding that five-year delay in 
trial was not a constitutional violation).  
72 Neil M. Ferguson et al., Impact of Non-Pharmaceutical Interventions (NPIs) to Reduce 
COVID-19 Mortality and Healthcare Demand (Mar. 16, 2020), 
https://www.imperial.ac.uk/media/imperial-college/medicine/sph/ide/gida-
fellowships/Imperial-College-COVID19-NPI-modelling-16-03-2020.pdf. 
73 Barker, 407 U.S. at 531. This is not an insubstantial point with respect to the federal 
criminal justice system, which handles large-scale conspiracies and street-level drug 
distribution alike. See UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMM’N, FISCAL YEAR 2018 
OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASES 4 (2019), 
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/research-
publications/2019/FY18_Overview_Federal_Criminal_Cases.pdf (reporting that drug 
crimes made up 28.1% of federal criminal cases while fraud, theft, and embezzlement 
made up 9.5% of cases). 
74 See, e.g., S.D.N.Y. Standing Order, supra note 23, at 1 (“[T]he Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention and other public health authorities have advised the taking of 
precautions to reduce the possibility of exposure to the virus and slow the spread of 
disease.”). 
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trial will necessarily stand on much weaker footing than an incarcerated 
pretrial defendant who has expressed a desire to proceed immediately to 
trial. This makes good sense given the central role of “personal prejudice” 
in determining whether a defendant has adequately asserted his right to a 
speedy trial.75  
The fourth factor—its own prejudice inquiry—will similarly vary case 
by case. As the speedy trial right was designed “(i) to prevent oppressive 
pretrial incarceration; (ii) to minimize anxiety and concern of the accused; 
and (iii) to limit the possibility that the defense will be impaired,” 76 a 
defendant can demonstrate prejudice by pointing to one of these interests. 
Obviously enough, a defendant who is incarcerated and runs the risk of 
having a defense impaired by continued delay will have a much stronger 
speedy trial claim than another defendant who is released on bond and has 
no similar risk of an impaired defense.77 
 The foregoing analysis should make one point very clear: while it is 
impossible to fashion any sort of general rule applicable to all defendants 
awaiting trial in the federal system during the coronavirus pandemic, very 
compelling claims based upon the Speedy Trial Clause are likely to result 
from this crisis. At the time of this writing, it is impossible to say with any 
certainty how long the coronavirus pandemic will shutter much of the 
federal court system. Yet, it is not impossible to imagine a world where 
criminal defendants who were prepared to proceed to trial in March 2020 
are still unable to do so in May or June of 2021. And while even longer 
delays have not been viewed as constitutional violations, the unique 
circumstances of the present coronavirus outbreak should alter this 
calculus. Put simply, scholars and judges must engage with the difficult 
reality before them: when the rights of a criminal defendant are stacked 
against the health of jurors and judges and attorneys, who wins? 
 The easy answer, perhaps, is to suggest that everyone can do so. 
Twenty-first century technology has allowed for a substantial segment of 
the population to continue their work largely unabated—albeit from 
 
75 Barker, 407 U.S. at 531. 
76 Id. at 532. 
77 A related yet independent constitutional question arises with respect to pretrial 
detainees, who are protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution. See City of Revere v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983). In 
particular, the Due Process Clause affords at least the same rights to pretrial detainees as 
does the Eighth Amendment. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 n.16 (1979). 
Confinement in a prison or jail for an indefinite period of time pending trial is arguably 
a violation of the Sixth Amendment’s Speedy Trial Clause, but pretrial confinement in 
prisons swarming with a lethal virus is also arguably impermissible “punishment” within 
the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 671–
72 n.40 (1977). This is a complicated constitutional question that this Article does not 
attempt to answer, but it is nonetheless deserving of future scrutiny. 
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home—during the pandemic.78 Videoconferencing and teleconferencing 
may actually provide opportunities for judges to conduct every proceeding 
short of an actual jury trial without exposing herself or her employees to 
the risk of any infection.79 Of course, this gets at the nub of the problem: 
that jury trials are unique, both in a practical and constitutional sense.80 
Attorneys can no more effectively conduct a voir dire examination via 
conference call than witnesses can identify evidence via videoconference. 
Similarly, jurors cannot be expected to apprehend evidence published to 
them in a courtroom as they would evidence emailed to them during some 
form of virtual trial. This presents a difficult obstacle for courts, which are 
charged by Barker with balancing the interests of a criminal defendant in 
a speedy trial with other, countervailing considerations.81  
 There is no single answer that can resolve this tension, but any 
conclusion should favor the rights of a criminal defendant (and 
particularly of a pretrial detainee) over the rights of the Government or a 
court to delay trial indefinitely. The current pandemic could largely abate 
in a matter of weeks—or it could not.82 In the latter case of years-long 
 
78 Tracy Hadden Loh & Lara Fishbane, COVID-19 Makes the Benefits of Telework 
Obvious, BROOKINGS INST. (Mar. 17, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/the-
avenue/2020/03/17/covid-19-makes-the-benefits-of-telework-obvious/. 
79 See Loeb et al., supra note 14 (noting that “some courts are offering oral arguments 
via video or telephone” in lieu of in-person argument to avoid risk of the disease). 
Congress recognized as much in the recently-enacted Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and 
Economic Security (“CARES”) Act, providing that “the chief judge of a district court . . . 
may authorize the use of video teleconferencing, or telephone conferencing if video 
teleconferencing is not reasonably available” for ten enumerated proceedings.  Pub. L. 
No. 116-136, § 15002, 134 Stat. 281, 528 (2020). These proceedings include, inter alia, 
detention hearings, initial appearances, probation and supervised release revocation 
hearings, and misdemeanor pleas and sentencings. Id. Felony pleas and sentencings are 
held to a higher standard and may only be conducted via teleconference if they “cannot 
be conducted in person without seriously jeopardizing public health and safety, and the 
district judge in a particular case finds for specific reasons that the plea or sentencing in 
that case cannot be further delayed without serious harm to the interests of justice.” Id. 
In either case, remote proceedings “may only take place with the consent of the 
defendant, or the juvenile, after consultation with counsel.” Id. No provision is made for 
shifting criminal trials to teleconference. See id. 
80 See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right . .  . to be confronted with the witnesses against him[.]”); see also Maryland v. Craig, 
497 U.S. 836, 850 (1990) (“[A] defendant's right to confront accusatory witnesses may 
be satisfied absent a physical, face-to-face confrontation at trial only where denial of such 
confrontation is necessary to further an important public policy and only where the 
reliability of the testimony is otherwise assured.”). 
81 This obstacle may be less daunting in civil bench trials, where the Confrontation Clause 
is not at issue and jurors are not involved. See Patricia Mazzei, A Major Trial for Voting 
Rights in Florida Is Happening on Video Chat, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 27, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/27/us/florida-felons-voting-trial.html. 
82 See Ferguson et al., supra note 72. 
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delay, it is likely that a significant portion of criminal defendants will have 
been denied a speedy trial under Barker.  
It of course bears repeating that the Supreme Court placed special 
emphasis on the ad hoc nature of Speedy Trial Clause claims and that each 
case will likely differ from the next. A defendant who is not detained will 
likely be unable to show the same degree of prejudice as a detained 
defendant, just as a defendant who has not actively asserted his right to a 
speedy trial will be less likely to receive relief.83 Yet, serious though the 
threat posed by the novel coronavirus is, courts must be equally mindful 
of the fundamental guarantees the Constitution affords to criminal 
defendants. When this pandemic ends, courts will be confronted with new 
and difficult claims to analyze under Barker. They should do so with an 
eye toward defendants and detainees who have asserted a right guaranteed 




 The Constitution guarantees all defendants the right to a speedy trial 
by jury. This right is of particular importance to those detained pending 
trial, facing the potential spread of the novel coronavirus from inside 
crowded prisons already primed for the rapid transmission of infectious 
disease. Courts closing their doors to the public and delaying jury trials 
are doing so for admirable reasons—to protect judges, jurors, employees, 
lawyers, and litigants from the spread of a disease that has already killed 
thousands and hospitalized countless more. Yet these reasons alone do not 
render the Sixth Amendment meaningless. Where the length and prejudice 
of a delay outweigh its justification, courts should enforce the guarantee 
to a speedy trial by dismissing indictments with or without prejudice; the 
Constitution requires nothing less.  
 
 
83 See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 502 (1972). 
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